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This paper discusses what could be done to expand 
services trade and investment through a multilateral 
agreement in the World Trade Organization. A 
distinction is made between market access liberalization 
and the regulatory preconditions for benefiting from 
market opening. The authors argue that prospects for 
multilateral services liberalization would be enhanced by 
making national treatment the objective of World Trade 
Organization services negotiations, thereby clarifying 
the scope of World Trade Organization commitments 
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for regulators. Moreover, liberalization by smaller and 
poorer members of the World Trade Organization 
would be facilitated by complementary actions to 
strengthen regulatory capacity. If pursued as part of the 
operationalization of the World Trade Organization’s 
2006 Aid for Trade taskforce report, the World Trade 
Organization could become more relevant in promoting 
not just services liberalization but, more importantly, 
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Introduction 
Recent literature surveys document that the potential gains from liberalization of trade in 
communications, finance, transport, business and other services are large (Hoekman, 
2006; Deardorff and Stern, 2007). For many countries the potential gains are significantly 
larger than those that could be derived from further liberalization of goods trade. 
Moreover, even exploiting the opportunities arising from goods trade liberalization will 
require better services. For example, Indian horticultural producers receive only one-sixth 
of the price that consumers pay because of inefficient storage, transport and distribution 
(Mattoo, Mishra and Narain, 2007).  
Notwithstanding the prospective gains from liberalization, WTO negotiations 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) have been going nowhere. 
The best market access offers made in the Doha Round do not even reflect the 
liberalization that countries have already implemented (Adlung and Roy, 2005). As a 
result, there is a serious risk of the GATS becoming irrelevant – increasingly lagging 
behind developments in service technology, regulation and business practice.  
After five years of fruitless negotiations on services, in 2006 WTO members 
launched an effort to complement the bilateral request-offer process with a plurilateral or 
“collective” approach. This involved subsets of the WTO membership seeking to agree to 
a common “minimum” set of policy commitments for a given sector. While arguably a 
step forward, we argue in this paper that for there to be a reasonable prospect of 
achieving significant increases in the coverage and depth of services commitments by 
WTO Members, more attention is needed for the regulatory context in which services 
liberalization takes place. In particular, regulators must be reassured that GATS 
commitments will not deprive them of the freedom to regulate; that liberalization will not 
be prematurely thrust upon countries with weak regulatory institutions; and that 
liberalization will be supported by international cooperation.  
Providing credible assurances that GATS commitments will only deprive 
regulators of the freedom to discriminate, and not limit their freedom in any other way, is 
necessary but not sufficient for a significant expansion in GATS commitments to occur. 
As, if not more, important is creating an effective multilateral mechanism to provide 
regulatory assistance to countries that need it. Dedicated assistance to improve regulatory 
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capacity in developing countries would help reassure policymakers that regulatory 
inadequacies that could undermine the benefits of liberalization will be diagnosed and 
remedied before any market-opening commitments take effect. Such assistance is 
arguably also critical for any significant liberalization of policies restraining temporary 
entry of foreign services providers: host countries need to be assured that source 
countries are willing and able to screen services providers, to accept and facilitate their 
return, and to combat illegal migration.  
An important step towards recognizing the importance of technical and financial 
assistance as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for liberalization of trade to 
generate greater benefits in poor countries was made in 2006 with the report on the WTO 
taskforce on Aid for Trade (WTO 2006). If services in general, and regulatory design and 
enforcement capacity more specifically, are given greater attention by countries in the 
operationalization of the recommendations of the taskforce, the prospects for mutually 
beneficial multilateral liberalization of trade in services could be much enhanced. In this 
paper we identify a number of areas in which regulatory cooperation and assistance 
would both be beneficial to recipients and support multilateral liberalization. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 discusses the economic 
fundamentals – why services and services trade and investment liberalization matter. 
Section 2 turns to the WTO and asks why such limited progress has been made 
multilaterally in delivering greater openness of services markets. Section 3 focuses on 
what could be done through ‘aid for trade’ to complement WTO disciplines by helping 
smaller and poorer members – the majority of the WTO membership – put in place both 
the regulatory mechanisms needed to achieve efficiency and equity objectives and assist 
in addressing some of the adjustment costs that will be generated by liberalization. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
1. Gains from Trade in Services 
It is only relatively recently that technological change and policy reforms allowed an 
increasing number of services to be traded internationally through telecommunications 
networks.  These developments have allowed an increasing number of services markets 
to be contested internationally through cross-border trade (mode 1 of the GATS) and FDI 
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(mode 3).
1 The average annual growth rate of business service exports for Brazil and 
China during 1995-2005 was 15 percent, for India it was 25 percent.
2 As a result, the 
share of traditional services such as transport and tourism in world trade has been falling 
steadily, although in absolute terms these activities have been growing at similar rates as 
world trade in goods, driven by improvements in technologies and reductions in the unit 
costs of transporting both containers and people across the globe.  
Policy reforms – liberalization, privatization – have complemented changes in 
technology in supporting the expansion of trade in services. These policy reforms have 
mostly been implemented by governments autonomously. There are powerful economic 
reasons to pursue policies to increase the contestability of services markets. An efficient, 
competitive financial sector is critical in ensuring that capital is deployed where it has the 
highest returns. Lower cost and higher quality telecommunications will generate 
economy-wide benefits, as this service is both an intermediate input and a “transport” 
mechanism for information services and other products that can be digitized. Similarly, 
transport services contribute to the efficient distribution of goods within and between 
countries and are the means through which services providers move to the location of 
clients (and vice versa). Business services such as accounting and legal services reduce 
transaction costs associated with the operation of financial markets and the enforcement 
of contracts. Retail and wholesale distribution services are a vital link between producers 
and consumers, with the margins that apply in the provision of such services influencing 
the competitiveness of firms on both the local and international market. 
Even in the poorest countries, services account for 40-50 percent of GDP and a 
significant share of employment. Not only would improved performance in services 
produce significant direct benefits, large indirect benefits would come from domestic 
farmers, households and firms obtaining access to better and cheaper services than they 
have today. Similarly, while the opportunity to export more agricultural and 
manufactured products is important, actions to improve the efficiency of the services 
sectors are vital to exploiting these opportunities.  
                                                 
1 Four ways or “modes” of engaging in trade in services are distinguished in the GATS: cross-border (mode 
1); through movement of the consumer to the location of the provider (mode 2); through longer-term cross 
border movement of the provider – i.e., establishment of FDI (mode 3); and temporary movement of 
providers (natural persons) (mode 4). 
2 The leader in this area was Ireland, with an annual rate of business services export growth of 31.6 percent. 
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Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian (2006) analyze the effects of trade and 
investment openness for the financial and telecommunications sector on growth in a 
cross-sectional analysis. Controlling for other determinants of growth, they find that 
countries that fully liberalized the financial services sector grew, on average, about 1 
percentage point faster than other countries. Fully liberalizing both the 
telecommunications and the financial services sectors was associated with an average 
growth rate 1.5 percentage points above that of other countries. Focusing on a sample of 
transition economies, Eschenbach and Hoekman (2006) find that services-related policies 
play an important role in attracting FDI. They explore the impact of financial and 
infrastructure services policy reforms on per capita income growth using time-series data 
covering the 1990-2004 period. Controlling for other potential explanatory variables, they 
find that improvements in services policies – infrastructure and finance – have a large and 
statistically significant positive impact on per-capita growth. 
The positive association between more efficient service sectors and overall 
economic performance implies that services policy reforms will help reduce poverty – as 
sustained economic growth is the most powerful instrument to reduce poverty. 
Underlying this aggregate, indirect relationship are many channels through which better 
services can directly improve economic outcomes for poor households, for example, by 
enhanced consumption of health and education. Another channel is by enhancing the 
benefits of trade reforms. Numerous country studies have concluded that greater trade 
opportunities can raise incomes but only if poor households produce products for the 
market. This may require active intervention to help households switch from subsistence 
to cash crops and improve productivity—through extension services, better access to 
credit and transportation services, and investments in infrastructure.
3  Domestic supply 
constraints are the main reason for the lack of trade growth and diversification in many of 
the poorest developing countries. Without action to improve supply capacity, reduce 
transport costs from remote areas, increase farm productivity and more generally improve 
the investment climate, trade opportunities cannot be fully exploited and the potential 
gains from trade will not be maximized. The needed reforms span numerous areas, but 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., the country studies in Hertel and Winters (2006) and Hoekman and Olarreaga (2007). 
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many of them are services-related.  
In addition to the “import dimension” stressed above, developing countries also 
have an export interest in services. Their exports of services have grown nearly four-fold 
in the last decade, to attain a share of the global marketplace of 18 percent. In large part 
this reflects growth in so-called business process outsourcing (BPO) services. This 
activity arises from the outsourcing (and out-location through FDI) of non-core business 
processes throughout the value chains of both manufacturing and services industries. 
Within BPO activities, the more advanced developing countries, such as India, are 
moving from providing only low-end back-office services (data entry, etc.) to more 
integrated and higher-end service bundles in fields such as customer care, human 
resource management, and product development. This move – reflected in a rising index 
of revealed comparative advantage in business services (Figure 1) – is creating space for 
other developing countries, from China to Senegal, to step into the more standardized 
segments of the market. 
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As noted above, the increase in global trade in business services reflects a mix of 
technological changes that allow more services to be traded cross-border and policy 
reforms. However, numerous barriers to trade and investment continue to prevail in most 
countries. The consensus view is that the tariff equivalents of these barriers are a multiple 
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of those affecting merchandise trade.
4 Studies that use available information on 
prevailing policies conclude that further services liberalization would have much greater 
positive effects on national welfare than the removal of trade barriers – see e.g., Konan 
and Maskus (2006) on Tunisia and Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2006) on Russia. Instead 
of the “standard” 1 percent increase in welfare from goods liberalization, introducing 
greater competition on services markets raises the gains to the 5-10 percent range or 
more. These large potential effects of services liberalization reflect both the importance 
of services in the economy and the extent to which many of them continue to be 
protected. Insofar as such protection reflects standard political economy factors – a desire 
by domestic incumbents and workers to retain rents, fears by policymakers regarding 
adjustment costs – there appears to be great scope to use the WTO as a mechanism to 
implement additional liberalization. 
2. The GATS: Asymmetric Interests and Regulatory Constraints  
One of the major results of the Uruguay Round was the creation of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). By establishing rules and disciplines on 
policies affecting access to service markets, the GATS greatly extended the coverage of 
the multilateral trading system. The original GATT-1947 did not cover services for the 
simple reason that at the time the GATT was negotiated, services were mostly 
nontradable. A key question from the perspective of international cooperation is what 
role trade agreements can/should play in supporting domestic regulatory reform efforts 
and enhancing access to foreign services markets. In principle, trade agreements can 
provide not only a mechanism for enhancing access to export markets and overcoming 
resistance by domestic interests to liberalization, but also may be a vehicle for agreement 
on policy reforms (“good regulatory practices”). The stylized fact that looms large here is 
that while some progress has been made to date in using the GATS framework to lock-in 
unilateral reforms that have already been implemented, the GATS has played virtually no 
role in inducing new liberalization. Indeed, it is fair to say that to date the GATS has been 
a disappointment.  
                                                 
4 See Hoekman (2006) and Mattoo, Stern and Zannini (2007). No comprehensive, cross-country, 
comparable datasets exist that allow a summary assessment of the prevailing levels of services trade and 
investment barriers.  
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Adlung and Roy (2005) have assessed both the current coverage of specific 
commitments of WTO members in the GATS and the offers that were on the table as of 
2006, when negotiations were suspended. For many countries the coverage of specific 
commitments is well below 50 percent of all services and modes of supply. Adlung and 
Roy conclude that not only do the requests and offers made in the 6 years following the 
launch of negotiations on services in 2000 imply little if any liberalization of policies; 
most countries were not even willing to use the GATS as a vehicle to “lock in” existing 
levels of openness.
5 
The lack of progress on services matters for several reasons.  First, as mentioned 
in the Introduction, the extant research concludes that the potential direct gains from 
reform of services trade for most WTO members are likely to be large. Second, services 
reform is needed to enable developing countries to take advantage of the new 
opportunities that arise from goods trade liberalization.  For example, Sub-Saharan 
African exporters today pay transport costs that are at least five times greater than the 
tariffs they face in industrial country markets, but neither international maritime nor air 
transport services figure seriously on the WTO agenda. Third, the WTO negotiating 
process requires countries that seek better market access to offer improved access to their 
own markets. In particular, attaining global liberalization of agriculture – a key objective 
of many developing countries – will require them to offer a quid pro quo. Greater 
opening in services, an area of export interest to many of the countries that protect their 
agriculture sectors is one obvious quid pro quo. For example, services exports are of key 
importance for the EU and India, two WTO members that confront serious political 
resistance to reducing barriers to trade in agriculture. 
A number of possible explanations for the lack of headway can be identified. As 
is well known, the WTO is driven by mercantilism: the desire by members to improve 
their access to the markets of other members. One explanation for the limited progress is 
that the standard mechanisms of reciprocity as developed over 50 years of GATT practice 
                                                 
5 A number of studies have shown that there is often a major gap between the actual level of openness of 
sectors and the level of commitments in the GATS. For example, Barth et al. (2006) compare data on 
specific GATS commitments for financial services with measures of actual policy in this sector for 123 
countries. They conclude that in practice applied policy is much more liberal than what was committed to 
in the GATS. 
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do not readily apply to services. There are at least two possible reasons for this: (i) the 
export interests that have been harnessed to allow the reciprocal liberalization of trade in 
goods do not prevail sufficiently in the services context; and (ii) regulatory concerns 
impede the ability (willingness) of WTO Members to engage in what Jagdish Bhagwati 
has termed “first difference” reciprocity (Hoekman, Mattoo, and Sapir, 2007).
6 
Asymmetric interests 
In the case of merchandise trade all WTO members have clear interests in improving 
access to export markets. Some countries are more diversified than others and all have 
differential specific interests – but all countries are exporters of goods that are subject to 
trade barriers in partner country markets. Thus they have exporters that see potential 
benefits from multilateral negotiations. This is less the case for services. While many 
developing countries – the majority of the WTO membership – are significant exporters 
of services, often the associated foreign exchange earnings are derived from activities 
where the relevant policies are under the control of the government as opposed to trading 
partners. The most important such “service” is tourism, where the export revenue 
generated depends primarily on measures that the tourism destination country puts in 
place itself.  
As far as cross-border trade in services via telecommunications networks is 
concerned, developing countries have export interests, but this channel for trade is often 
not constrained by policy in the importing country  (with the exception of services such 
as gambling where importing countries may reserves the activity to the State or ban it 
altogether). Most of the business process outsourcing, call centers, etc. that are growth 
areas for many countries are not constrained by trade policy measures in the destination 
or importing country. While there is certainly increasing opposition against such trade in 
high-income countries, outside of government contracts there is little that is currently 
done to restrict such activities from being “offshored.”  
Turning to FDI (mode 3, or establishment), most developing countries do not 
                                                 
6 These issues were identified early on in the literature on trade in services. On the problem of asymmetric 
interests, first difference reciprocity and limited and concentrated export interests, see e.g., Hoekman 
(1994, 1997). On the importance of sectoral regulation and the interests of regulators was identified by 
economists early in the process of multilateral negotiations on services – see e.g., Feketekuty (1988) and 
Messerlin (1990).  
  8 
have significant “offensive” interests – they do not have indigenous multinational service 
providers seeking better access to foreign markets. This is a mode that is primarily of 
interest to firms based in high-income countries and large emerging economies. 
The one mode where developing countries confront particularly high barriers and 
that is therefore of great relevance to potential exporters is mode 4. However, mode 4 is 
politically extremely sensitive. Insofar as there are no serious prospects for mode 4 
liberalization in the GATS framework, most of the potential export interests in many 
developing countries are disengaged from the process. 
These considerations imply that a key driver of the reciprocity mechanism – 
services exporters – is either missing or much weaker in many WTO members than is 
true for goods. The exception are large service firms that are based in high-income 
economies, which have clear interests in selling more services to both OECD and to 
developing countries. This is mostly a mode 3 (FDI) agenda. The implication is that if 
access negotiations are to be restricted within the services arena, deals are likely to be 
limited to mode 3 exchanges (largely an intra-OECD/large emerging markets affair) or 
better access for developing countries through mode 4 to OECD markets in return for 
mode 3 liberalization by developing countries. As argued below, a precondition for 
making headway in the liberalization of mode 4 is regulatory cooperation between host 
and source countries – limiting the focus to “trade policy” concessions by potential host 
countries (e.g., seeking to negotiate market access quotas) is only likely to be feasible if 
complemented by a commitment by source countries to manage such trade. 
Regulatory constraints 
The intangible nature of most services makes it hard for buyers of services to investigate 
or test their quality prior to purchase. The extent of asymmetric information often creates 
a necessity to regulate services in order to protect consumers. Regulating services may 
also be desirable in order to remedy other types of market failures, including imperfect 
competition, which is often present in network services such as telecommunications 
where the number of providers is limited, and externalities. Externalities may cause a 
problem if there is also imperfect information – e.g., in the case of financial services, 
where the failure of one institution may cause problems to the entire sector. For all these 
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reasons, activities tend to be highly regulated. 
Although consumers should in principle favor reforms that increase the number of 
suppliers and, in principle, lower prices and/or increase the range of services offered, they 
may in fact oppose them for fear that reforms will lower service quality and/or increase 
the market power of (foreign) firms. Regulators may be concerned that trade 
liberalization will impede their ability to enforce domestic regulatory standards. Trade 
will bring with it regulatory competition if services suppliers are only subject to the 
norms and standards that apply in their home markets. This is particularly likely to be the 
case for mode 1 trade. As case in point was the dispute between Antigua and Barbuda 
and the US on gambling services. The WTO Panel and Appellate Body ruled that the US 
prohibition of internet gambling was inconsistent with the specific commitments the US 
had made on market access, even though the US prohibition applied equally to foreign 
and US providers. The inconsistency arose because specific commitments on market 
access preclude even non-discriminatory (regulatory) prohibitions.  Similarly, if mode 4 
trade is permitted to occur on the basis of the qualifications and certifications obtained in 
the home country of providers, there may be concerns regarding whether host country 
norms are met. A critical – and difficult – question then is how to differentiate between 
legitimate concerns relating to quality and performance, and regulatory requirements that 
simply constitute barriers to entry, creating rents for incumbents by raising prices. 
In addition to concerns about the ability to enforce national regulatory standards, 
in developing countries liberalization may raise an additional regulation-related issue: 
achieving social equity objectives. The impacts of more competitive market structures 
following liberalization on access to services by poorer households in developing 
countries have been mixed.  In cases like mobile telecommunications, a positive 
relationship has been observed in many developing countries because initial conditions 
were bad – few households had access. However, in other areas, like financial services, 
unless improved regulatory measures are put in place, liberalization may have an adverse 
effect on access to credit for rural areas and the poor. Putting in place mechanisms to 
ensure better access to services post-liberalization is important from an equity 
perspective. It is also important from a political economy perspective to bolster support 
for implementing efficiency enhancing policy reforms and sustaining them over time. 
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Absent actions to address regulatory weaknesses, countries may not be in a position to 
fully realize the potential benefits of trade reforms in services (or goods).  
The prevalence of regulation further complicates and constrains use of the 
traditional GATT reciprocity mechanism for services because it is very difficult to design 
multilateral rules and national commitments in a way that clearly separates or 
distinguishes between measures that are protectionist and measures that have good 
domestic efficiency or social equity rationales. As the focus of WTO negotiations is not 
on the welfare of members or on the identification of “good” policy, regulators may 
therefore be concerned that market access negotiating dynamics could adversely affect 
their ability to design and implement regulatory norms that maximize national welfare.
7 
Emerging Multilateral Responses 
Between 2000, when as specified in the GATS new multilateral services negotiations 
were launched, and the end of 2005, WTO Members pursued a bilateral approach to 
negotiations, submitting requests to others and responding to requests with (conditional) 
offers. Requests tended to be highly ambitious and offers mostly minimalist. The large 
asymmetries in interests across the membership impeded progress, with most small and 
poor countries not perceiving much of an incentive to offer significant commitments. 
A different tack was introduced at the December 2005 WTO ministerial meeting 
in Hong Kong.  Annex C of the 2005 WTO ministerial declaration endorsed a shift 
towards plurilateral or collective negotiations among subsets of members. Plurilateral 
requests were to be made by end February 2006, followed by bilateral/plurilateral 
negotiations leading to submission of revised offers by July 2006. The idea was to limit 
talks to a critical mass of countries, so as to reduce transactions costs while still ensuring 
that most of the gains from agreement would be internalized among those participating. 
The pursuit of what Schelling (1978) has called a “k-group strategy” – the minimum 
number of countries (‘K”) out of a larger set (“N”) that internalizes enough of the total 
potential gains from cooperation to make free riding by the remaining N-K players 
feasible – is easier to implement in the WTO setting for services than it is for goods trade 
                                                 
7 One potential explanation for the steadily expanding number of bilateral or regional trade agreements that 
include services is that cooperation on services policies is easier to achieve in a small numbers context. 
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because of the way the GATS is structured.
8 The positive list approach to define the 
country coverage of specific commitments on a sector-by-sector basis already requires 
that negotiations be sectoral. 
The decision to move to negotiations among subsets of countries and focus on 
agreeing to a set of “minimum standards” for liberalizing commitments— thus shifting 
the burden on a Member to justify its refusal to concede the threshold level rather than on 
other Members to extract the minimum concessions – implies a move away from the type 
of first difference reciprocity that is the bread and butter of GATT negotiations. Instead, 
the focus becomes achieving a common set of policies that apply to all signatories, while 
allowing for de facto differentiation between WTO members in terms of participation. 
Countries that have little to offer for a specific sector or mode are effectively exempted 
from participation – they can “free ride” on the outcome of negotiations between the 
“principal stakeholders”.  
Plurilateral talks were pursued among some 30-40 countries starting in early 
2006.
9 Requests were tabled for legal; architecture/ engineering; computer-related; 
postal/courier; telecommunications; audiovisual; construction; distribution; education; 
environmental; financial; maritime; air transport; and energy services, as well as cross-
border trade (modes 1/2); mode 3; mode 4; and MFN Exemptions (general, financial and 
audiovisual) (Chaudhuri, 2006). The negotiations involved mostly OECD members and 
large emerging economies. Requests were generally less ambitious than those made 
bilaterally, which often called for full market access and national treatment in sectors of 
export interest to the demandeur. Two rounds of talks were held before the Doha round 
was suspended in July 2006. A third set of meetings occurred in April 2007 after 
negotiations resumed.  News reports suggest that although progress was made as a result 
of the shift to the new negotiating modalities, the inability to move forward on agriculture 
and nonagricultural market access dominated the efforts of negotiators.  At the time of 
writing it is not possible to assess what the ultimate outcome of the plurilateral approach 
will be (might have been). 
                                                 
8 Article XIX GATS mentions plurilateral negotiations as modality that could be used by Members. 
9 Past practice suggests that for sectoral liberalization agreements to be applied on a MFN basis the 
“internalization” ratio needs to be on the order of 90 percent of total trade. This was the figure used in the 
negotiations on the Information Technology Agreement. 
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Although WTO members clearly recognized a change in tack was needed to deal 
with the problem of asymmetric interests, the shift towards small(er) group negotiations 
does not address the regulatory constraints identified above: worries about regulatory 
autonomy (which apply as much to the large players involved in the plurilateral talks as 
to the countries that are permitted to free ride) and limitations in the capacity of poor 
countries to put in place and enforce regulatory measures to complement liberalization. 
Indeed, by effectively excluding the majority of the WTO membership from negotiations, 
the plurilateral approach creates a new problem: exempted countries may not be 
confronted with a need to liberalize, but they also are excluded from the potential gains 
associated with undertaking domestic policy reforms themselves. Moreover, insofar as 
such reforms are needed to exploit export opportunities, they may also lose out on that 
front. The first problem can be resolved through explicit measures that guarantee to 
regulators that their autonomy will not be constrained by the GATS. Mattoo (2005) and 
Hoekman, Mattoo and Sapir (2007) argue that making national treatment the primary 
objective of negotiations would do much to provide such assurances. The second problem 
requires actions to assist developing countries to improve domestic regulatory capacities. 
Despite increasing recognition among WTO members that more needs to be done to 
provide assistance to developing countries to bolster trade capacity – exemplified by the 
creation in Hong Kong of an “Aid for Trade” taskforce – to date services have not 
attracted much attention in aid for trade deliberations. 
3.  Supporting Services Reforms in Developing Countries 
In the WTO services negotiation, many developing countries have pursued three goals:  
retaining flexibility in making liberalizing commitments; securing commitments from 
other countries in sectors and modes of export interest to them; and obtaining assistance 
to enhance the capacity of their services sectors.  To date they have succeeded in 
achieving only the first goal.  Over the last decade, the international trading community 
has moved towards progressively less demanding positions vis-à-vis the poorest 
developing countries. GATS Article IV on the Increasing Participation of Developing 
Countries notes that “Particular account shall be taken of the serious difficulty of the 
least-developed countries [LDCs] in accepting negotiated specific commitments in view 
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of their special economic situation and their development, trade and financial needs.”  
The December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration went even further, stating, “We 
recognize the particular economic situation of LDCs, including the difficulties they face, 
and acknowledge that they are not expected to undertake new commitments.” 
With respect to the other two goals, the LDCs have had less success.  Beginning 
with GATS (in Articles IV and XIX), and continuing through the Hong Kong Ministerial 
Declaration, there have been exhortations that WTO Members “give special priority to 
providing effective market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to 
LDCs, through negotiated specific commitments …” (Article XIX GATS). As already 
noted, little has been offered in the area of greatest export interest for the LDCs: mode 4, 
especially the provision of services through the movement of unskilled workers.  
Assistance to develop services sectors has also not been very forthcoming in the 
WTO context, although calls to mobilize additional aid resources to support trade 
capacity-building in developing countries have proliferated in recent years.
10 The focus 
of the WTO is on market access. Policy advice and assistance for regulatory reform an
public investments in services infrastructure are provided by international financial 
institutions and specialized agencies.  There is virtually no link between the two 
processes. This disconnect persists even though improved regulation – ranging from 
prudential regulation in financial services to pro-competitive regulation in a variety of 
network-based services – will be critical to realizing the benefits of services liberalization 
in many sectors. Policy intervention will also be necessary to ensure universal service 
because liberalization per se will not always deliver adequate access to the poor. There 
may be good reasons to defer liberalization and/or not to make binding commitments if 
there are weaknesses in prudential or pro-competitive regulation, adjustment costs are 
likely to be severe and affect the feasibility/sustainability of reform. 
d 
                                                
At the 2005 WTO ministerial in Hong Kong a number of specific commitments 
were made by high-income countries to expand allocations for trade assistance. The 
 
10 An important first step towards mobilizing additional resources was the commitment by the G-8 Heads of 
Government at Gleneagles in 2005 to increase aid to developing countries to build physical, human, and 
institutional capacity to trade, and to grant additional support for trade capacity building. At the September 
2005 IMF/World Bank annual meetings, Ministers endorsed the need to expand aid resources to bolster 
trade capacity in developing countries. 
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Ministerial Declaration requires Members to provide “targeted and effective technical 
assistance and capacity building for LDCs ... to strengthen their domestic services 
capacity, build institutional and human capacity, and enable them to undertake 
appropriate regulatory reforms.” The challenge is to operationalize this commitment and 
to extend it to a broader set of developing countries. 
The ministerial meeting agreed to create a task force with the mandate to make 
specific proposals on moving forward on aid for trade to the WTO General Council in 
July 2006. In its July report – one of the few instances where a deadline established in the 
Doha round was met – the taskforce stressed the central role of country ownership and of 
mainstreaming trade into countries’ development strategies, and called on donors to 
provide additional funding on a predictable basis. The report defined aid for trade as 
covering assistance for trade policy (including training, analysis, and institutional and 
technical support), trade development activities (including trade and investment 
promotion, business support services, trade finance and other activities), development of 
trade-related physical infrastructure, building productive capacity, and support for trade-
related adjustment. This wide definition of aid for trade implies that many services will 
be covered, although where the boundaries may lie in practice remains to be determined. 
The report proposed that WTO members explore the necessity of establishing a 
mechanism similar to the Integrated Framework for Trade-related technical Assistance 
(IF) – a joint venture involving the IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, WTO and the World 
Bank that assists LDCs in identifying trade priorities and designing project proposals to 
address them – to assess priorities in non-LDCs; calls for donors to make funds available 
for building infrastructure and removing supply-side constraints – over and above 
capacity building and technical assistance – including in the form of  co-financing with 
multilateral development bank; urged donors and agencies, together with regional banks 
and organizations, to step up their efforts to identify regional, sub-regional and cross-
border trade projects; proposed an annual review of Aid for Trade by a monitoring body 
in the WTO to be discussed in the WTO General Council, and suggested that an  
assessment of aid for trade be included in WTO Trade Policy Reviews.
11 
                                                 
11  See Prowse (2006) and Njinkeu and Cameron (2007) for in-depth discussions of “aid for trade,” 
including the genesis and functioning of the IF and options for moving forward. 
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The taskforce does not provide specific proposals in its report to operationalize its 
recommendations. Numerous questions remain to be resolved, including how resources 
should be managed and allocated, what countries will be eligible, and what the role of the 
WTO and the various development institutions should be. Whatever is agreed on the 
allocation mechanisms and modalities, much of the aid for trade agenda at the country 
level in our view revolves around improving the quality and cost of services. The agenda 
goes far beyond technical assistance to help countries make market access commitments 
– the focus of much current assistance (as illustrated for example by the language on 
technical assistance for services negotiations in the Hong Kong ministerial declaration). It 
spans helping countries overcome the political economy factors that impede 
liberalization; improving domestic regulation; adopting measures that spread the benefits 
of liberalization to poor and disadvantaged households; support for the pursuit of regional 
cooperation; and measures that are preconditions for obtaining and exploiting better 
market access in export markets. What follows briefly discusses each of these areas. 
Political economy: redistributing rents and dealing with adjustment costs 
Poor policies in many countries often reflect standard political economy forces: those 
who gain (or are not hurt) from current policies are more economically and politically 
powerful than those who lose. In the case of telecommunications, for example, the 
incumbent provider may confront an administered price structure (with artificially high 
international prices and artificially low local prices). Liberalization will require tariff 
rebalancing to allow the incumbent to compete on the international segment. The 
resultant increase in local call prices is likely to be resisted by the politically vocal urban 
consumers, though the prospect of more competitive mobile telephony may dilute such 
opposition. Putting in place transparent and credible compensatory measures (e.g. 
voluntary retirement schemes, access to cheaper mobile telephony) could help persuade 
the incumbent’s employees and urban consumers to accept reform.  
Similar forces play out in other sectors. In Zambia,
12 a country that being 
landlocked confronts higher transportation costs than many coastal countries, high costs 
are partly due to restrictions that Zambia imposes on air and road transport. While these 
                                                 
12  What follows draws on detailed analyses in Mattoo and Payton (2007). 
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are detrimental to exporters, they benefit import competing interests and domestic 
transport service providers.
13 In accounting, local professionals in Zambia are geared 
almost entirely towards the lucrative large firm market and the use of international 
accounting and auditing standards. Although these are recognized to be excessively 
burdensome (costly) for SMEs, the accounting profession has an interest generating the 
revenue associated with audits.  
Identifying the magnitude and incidence of the costs and benefits of prevailing 
policies that inhibit competition from foreign providers and developing mechanisms to 
assist losers is one area where aid for trade resources can make a difference in helping 
governments deal with vested interests that resist changes to the status quo. 
Implementing appropriate domestic regulation 
As noted previously, regulation is often needed in services sectors to achieve efficiency 
and equity objectives. Designing appropriate regulatory standards and institutions takes 
time, as they often must be tailored to national circumstances to be effective and attain 
the desired objective. An increasing body of evidence has shown that a “one size fits all” 
approach – including international “best practice” norms – may not be appropriate. 
Reverting to the example of Zambia, in addition to the accounting example just 
mentioned, burdensome regulatory requirements for banks relating to documentation, 
collateral, and money laundering restrict access to credit for small enterprises and the 
rural poor, while not affecting much large firms or the urban rich. A fear of being 
blacklisted generates a chilling effect on the incentives for banks to explore or propose 
less burdensome alternatives to regulatory requirements.  
The Zambia case illustrates the types of complementary measures that will have 
the most effect in increasing the gains from liberalization will not be uniform across 
countries.  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006), in the first comprehensive cross-country 
assessment of the impact of the Basel Committee's influential approach to bank 
regulation, conclude that there is no evidence that any single set of “best practices” is 
appropriate for promoting well-functioning banks. There is need, therefore, for a high 
                                                 
13 E.g., foreign entry in cabotage activities is prohibited and international transporters may move products 
between two foreign countries only if they pass through their own country. 
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degree of country specificity in both diagnosis and remedial action. This is more time- 
and labor-intensive – i.e., expensive – than is the adoption of (international) norms “off 
the shelf.” 
Improving domestic access to better services 
For the poorest countries in particular, the desired investment response to liberalization 
(entry by foreign providers) may be muted and take long to materialize.
14 Structural 
factors such as economic size or location may imply that some countries or parts of 
countries will not be attractive enough to induce entry by private firms, whether foreign 
or domestic. Or, the market may be too small to allow vigorous competition. Such 
situations will result in limited access, if any, for many poor households or rural 
communities. Improving the distribution of access to services could be achieved by 
targeting aid for trade on service providers to encourage them to provide services in 
remote and disadvantaged regions in poor countries and/or to lower the prices of such 
services below what would be needed to cover costs. In our view this could be an 
important dimension of an effective “aid for trade” strategy to complement and support 
multilateral trade reforms. Here we are not thinking of fiscal investment or entry 
incentives of the type offered by virtually all developing countries to foreign investors. 
These are costly and of dubious value. Instead, the idea is to use development aid funds 
to induce services firms – foreign or nationally owned – to provide specific services to 
households that otherwise would not be served. 
  The experience of a number of countries in the last decade has improved our 
understanding of how universal access policies can be used to complement market-based 
reforms to improve access for the poor to infrastructure services. In network industries 
such as telecommunications or electricity private providers could compete for 
performance-based subsidies related to providing services to the poor.
15  This would 
ensure that the poor to reap some of the benefits of competition, and while minimizing 
outlays for the government – the “reverse auction” process allows it to discover the true 
                                                 
14 What follows draws in part on Hoekman and Mattoo (2007). 
15 The picture is less clear for other, especially social, services. We do not know whether this is because 
these services are inherently different, e.g. because performance is so much more difficult to measure, or 
because governments have been less willing to experiment with new policies in these areas. 
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cost of service provision. Countries such as Chile, Peru and Uganda have put in place 
such mechanisms, which have helped to expand services to areas that otherwise would 
not have access. Based on the Chilean experience,
16  Kenny and Keremane (2007) 
estimate that an upper bound on the amount needed for achieving universal access to 
basic telecommunications using competitively awarded subsidies to private providers in 
developing countries is some $5.7 billion. Of this amount, $1.8 billion could not be 
supplied by a reasonable tax on existing providers, and would need to be generated from 
outside the sector. Most of this – some $1.5 billion –would be needed in Africa. 
  An international arrangement that replicates the key elements of successful 
national schemes may be one way to use additional aid for trade resources to increase 
support for pro-competitive reforms. This could involve countries (or regions) that are 
willing to eliminate barriers to investment being given assistance to put in place both the 
necessary regulatory reforms and granted access to a “universal service provision fund” 
in instances where the investment response from domestic and foreign firms had been 
inadequate. Funds would be made available to provide a subsidy to firms to create 
infrastructure and/or provide services in the relevant region or country at pre-specified 
terms. Along the lines of the policies put in place in Chile, the Dominican Republic, Peru, 
and Uganda, these terms could be established as the result of an reverse auction or 
bidding process under which firms would indicate the minimum level of subsidy they 
would require to fulfill the mandate set out by the government. Note that this form of 
assistance does not target specific industries or firms, as would industrial policies or trade 
preferences.  Rather the objective would be to improve the availability and quality of 
services for all firms, farms and households in areas that would otherwise be 
underserved.
17 
                                                 
16 The subsidy needed to provide universal access in Chile varied across sub-regions, with poor, sparsely 
populated areas requiring a larger per capita subsidy. Income density explains over 60 percent in the 
variation of subsidy cost. Kenny and Keremane (2007) therefore use income density data for other 
countries to estimate what would be needed to achieve universal access.  
17 In the case of trade preferences proposals have been made to shift towards financial instruments, on both 
efficiency and systemic grounds, and as a mechanism to compensate beneficiary countries for the erosion 
of the value of preferences as MFN barriers are lowered. The services “aid for trade” proposals made in this 
paper could also be part of an effort to address preferences erosion losses, but they are primarily focused on 
the set of countries that have not been able to utilize preferences as a result of supply constraints. See e.g., 
Hoekman and Prowse (2005) for a discussion of preferences and aid for trade. 
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Supporting regional cooperation on services  
The potential benefits of regional cooperation in addressing supply side constraints for 
small and land-locked countries can be large. Regional cooperation can lower costs and 
enhance global competitiveness of exporters by removing duplicative regulatory controls, 
and allowing firms and governments to realize economies of scale by spreading the fixed 
costs of services provision and regulation over a larger area. The establishment of 
transport and trade facilitation corridors linking two or more countries can be a 
mechanism that reduces trade costs both directly and indirectly – by increasing the 
incentives of all countries involved to monitor “performance” of the corridor.  
For smaller countries, regulatory cooperation may allow the substantial fixed 
costs associated with regulatory bodies to be shared. For example, in basic 
telecommunications, apart from spectrum monitoring equipment, computers and 
programs, there is the cost of professional assistance for activities such as 
interconnection, cost estimation and spectrum management.  An example is the Eastern 
Caribbean Telecommunications Authority (ECTEL), the first regional 
telecommunications authority in the world. Although the member countries retain their 
sovereign power over licensing and regulation, ECTEL provides technical expertise, 
advice and support for national regulations.  Apart from the economies of scale in 
establishing a common regulator, there are at least three other advantages.  It will 
promote the development of harmonized and transparent regulation in the region, allow 
for a greater degree of independence (and hence credibility) in regulatory advice, and 
enhance bargaining power in negotiations with incumbents and potential entrants. 
Technical assistance to determine “what, where and how much” is particularly 
important in the regional context. For example, should regulations in say, professional 
services be harmonized first within a subset of, say, COMESA countries, on a COMESA-
wide basis, or directly vis-à-vis the EU (in the context of the future Economic Partnership 
Agreement), or not at all?  To some extent the needs confronting governments with 
respect to regional cooperation are similar to those that arise in the GATS context: 
whether to bind (in some or all dimensions) immediate or gradual market opening, or not 
to bind at all.  But much of the agenda at a regional level will span issues that are not 
relevant to a multilateral context – e.g., “local” cross-border spillovers or club goods such 
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as roads and shared ports, joint tourism marketing, development of regional infrastructure 
hubs, etc. 
Facilitating market access through broader cooperation, particularly on Mode 4 
Facilitating regulatory cooperation could help deal with apprehensions about 
liberalization on all modes. For example, in financial services, confidence in cooperation 
by the home country regulator of suppliers could facilitate greater openness to both 
commercial presence and cross-border trade by host countries. Similarly, in international 
transport services, confidence in the enforcement of home-country competition law may 
increase the willingness to liberalize in importing countries.  
The area that is probably of greatest interest to many developing countries – 
whether large emerging markets or the LDCs – in direct trade terms is to achieve 
progress on mode 4. To date, mode 4 has been (another) millstone for the services 
negotiations. To support a positive outcome on mode 4, Members need to recognize that 
simply asserting that mode 4 is about trade in services and not about migration cannot 
dispel the deep-rooted fears raised by the entry of foreign providers in many countries. 
Whatever one’s views of the legitimacy of those fears, to make progress they have to be 
acknowledged and addressed. 
Immigration authorities in host economies must be assured that source countries 
will cooperate to screen services providers, to accept and facilitate their return, and to 
combat illegal migration. The approach pursued to date in the WTO by developing 
countries has been to request that potential host countries make binding commitments on 
an MFN basis, regardless of the conditions that prevail in source countries or measures 
that governments in such countries should implement in order to manage mode 4 trade. 
One way to take a more cooperative and less antagonistic approach to mode 4 is to draw 
upon the experience of a few relatively successful bilateral and regional trade 
agreements. Greater progress might be feasible if more is done to also impose obligations 
on source countries. This is a key element of regional agreements (e.g. APEC) that have 
facilitated mobility of skilled workers and bilateral labor agreements (e.g. between Spain 
and Ecuador, Canada and the Caribbean, Germany and Eastern Europe) that have to a 
limited extent improved access for the unskilled.  Source country obligations in these 
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agreements include pre-movement screening and selection, accepting and facilitating 
return of workers, and commitments to combat illegal migration.  Cooperation by the 
source can help address security concerns, ensure temporariness and prevent illegal labor 
flows in a way that the host country is incapable of accomplishing alone. In effect, such 
cooperation constitutes a service for which the host may be willing to “pay” by allowing 
increased access. 
How might such elements be incorporated in a multilateral agreement?  One 
possibility is that host countries commit under the GATS to allow access to any source 
country that fulfills certain pre-specified conditions – along the lines of mutual 
recognition agreements in other areas. Even if these conditions were unilaterally specified 
and compliance determined unilaterally, it would still be a huge improvement over the 
arbitrariness and lack of transparency in existing visa schemes. Although negotiating 
these conditions multilaterally and establishing a mechanism to certify their fulfillment 
would be an improvement over the unequal, non-transparent and potentially labor-
diverting bilateral context, this is simply not feasible in the short run. Given the large 
differences in the ability of source countries to satisfy whatever conditions are put in 
place there is a clear case for high-income countries also providing assistance to poorer 
countries to attain them. This is an area where regulatory cooperation between host and 
home countries, supported by development assistance from rich countries, could do much 
to assuage fears on the part of voters and governments in the North that mode 4 is simply 
another form of long-term migration.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Little progress has been made in WTO services negotiations since these were launched in 
2000. In part this is because liberalization of trade in goods has been central to discussion 
to date – there has been less interest in, and thus attention given to, the services agenda. 
The neglect matters. Greater trade in services can do much to improve consumer welfare 
and the productivity of firms and farms in WTO members by providing a greater variety 
of quality services at lower prices.  
WTO members have begun to recognize some of the constraints affecting 
multilateral cooperation on services trade policies. The shift to a small group, plurilateral 
  22 
set of negotiations in 2006 reflected recognition that many developing countries have 
little incentive to participate in mercantilist bargaining over market access. The 
increasing prominence of “aid for trade” reflects increasing acceptance of the idea that 
market access negotiations need to be complemented by measures to help developing 
countries benefit from liberalization.  
A precondition for achieving greater ambition in the services negotiations is to put 
in place mechanisms that will bolster pro-competitive regulation and strengthen 
regulatory authorities in developing countries. Many countries need assistance to put in 
place the regulatory mechanisms that can help ensure the potential benefits from 
liberalization are realized.  There is great potential for donor countries to both do good – 
assist developing countries to benefit from services-related reforms – while also doing 
well in terms of obtaining better access to developing country markets.  
Accommodating the interests of the small and poor countries by providing them 
with “aid for trade” in services is desirable in itself, but also necessary to ensure smooth 
and expeditious progress in the WTO. Aid is a necessary complement, not a substitute for 
the core role of the WTO: to provide a mechanism to make binding policy commitments. 
All countries, including the poorest, can benefit from making reform more credible and 
certain through legally binding international commitments that are costly to revoke. Even 
in instances where there is reason to defer market opening, for example, to give the 
incumbent and/or regulator time to prepare for competition, there is still a good rationale 
for governments to make reform objectives credible through binding commitments to 
future liberalization. Such commitments avoid the danger of perpetual infancy and hence 
perpetual protection by confronting incumbents and regulators with a credible deadline 
by when they must be equipped to deal with openness. 
The comparative advantage of the WTO in the aid-for-trade context is to act as a 
focal point for the trade-related capacity building agenda – providing “space” and a 
mandate for trade interests in developing country members to defend trade projects as 
priorities for national action and support by donors and international agencies. We have 
argued in this paper that addressing national trade needs and priorities must span the 
services sectors. Doing so may over time bolster support in developing countries for 
making multilateral liberalization commitments. But even if it does not result in such an 
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outcome, a much greater emphasis on services in the operationalization of aid for trade 
will be beneficial in itself. 
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